We investigate the popular perception about economic reforms having benefitted only the richer districts between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005. Using the spatial dynamics of districtlevel per-capita income we found that income distribution did not change between the years examined. We argue that this is because of per-capita income across districts being spatially positively correlated. We identify physical infrastructure, human capital, and factories, as factors responsible for increase in income for both the rich as well as the poor districts. Infrastructure, physical or social, is a key component of growth in India. A policy impact analysis shows development of better drainage and potable water systems has a large impact on income. For the year 2001/02, we find that for every 1 per cent increase in closed drainage system and potable water, district-level median income increases by 1.39 per cent and 0.21 per cent, respectively.
Introduction
In 2004, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government came to power after defeating the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government. This defeat for the NDA government came in spite of the fact that Indian economy was growing fast, at 8.5 per cent in 2003/2004 . A popular perception explaining the ousting of the then ruling NDA government lay in its inability to check rise in regional income inequality. How true then, is this perception about economic reforms enhancing regional income disparity? We answer this question by studying the dynamics of income distributional pattern in India. If reforms are favouring rich-income districts then we would see the emergence of twin peaks in the underlying income distribution function:
clustering of the rich-income district, and clustering of the poor-income district with pockets of economic growth pulling-up the national average income. On the other hand, a uniform growth process at a pan-India level would lead to a disappearance of such clusters. Considering district-level per-capita income data from the Planning This idea is in concurrence of Quah (1993 Quah ( , 1996 , and Jones (1997) ,who introduce the notion of twin peaks in the cross-country distribution of incomes. Quah (1993, 1996) found evidence about persistence, and stratification of income density functions.
3 Jones (1997) observed that clustering can be a temporary phenomenon, as may happen with high frequency growth miracles data. Emergence of twin peaks implies polarization of the cross-country income distribution into rich and poor convergence clubs.
As there has been no evidence in favour of change in the underlying income distribution in spite of the fact that median level of income has increased, we endeavour to investigate why this has happened, and the factors (as captured through development, and other policy indicators) responsible. In the process of analyzing the interaction between income and policy variables affecting income, such as education, health, and other development indicators, we separate out, and quantify the direct (own) effect, the direct neighbourhood effect and indirect neighbourhood effect. A direct effect reflects how the level of development (captured through development indicators) in any particular district i affects its own income. Direct neighbourhood effect captures how the level of development in any neighbouring district (say, j) affects the income level of district i. The indirect neighbourhood effects captures how the increase in income in neighbouring district j affects income in district i.
We find that opportunities to earn income (measured in terms of district-level percapita income) in the neighbouring districts positively affect income in district i. 4 The indirect neighbourhood effect results in spillovers of income from one district to the other, thereby resulting in concurrent movement in per-capita income across districts.
The Indian constitution guarantees free movement of labour and capital across districts in India, thereby, guaranteeing a more balanced spatial distribution of income. In general, development indicators, such as physical and social infrastructure including, electricity, hospitals, closed drainage system, drinking water, and banks positively affect income of any particular region; thereby implying infrastructure, physical or social, is a key component of growth.
To our knowledge this study is the first scientific attempt that makes use of district-level data from India, and quantifies the neighbourhood effect using spatial econometric techniques. 4 Economies of neighbouring districts are interdependent. This can happen through economic agents such as firms located in different districts trading among themselves; or through peer-group effects where externalities in local labor market due to production, matching, and other market interaction involve movement of labors from one district to another; and even through network externalities of infrastructure.
Earlier studies
Whether economic reforms in India has widened the gap between the richer and the poorer states, the evidence is mixed. (Anselin, 1988) . 
Empirical model
The empirical analysis has three parts.
In the first part of the analysis we see how per-capita district-level income distribution (absolute, and median (relative) district i. A positive γ implies otherwise. For instance, it is expected that districts in the neighbourhood of big cities will enjoy some positive externalities and hence will tend to have a higher income as compared to districts located further away. Gautam Budh Nagar (a district bordering Delhi), and Gurgaon (a district in Haryana in the neighbourhood of Delhi) are expected to have a positive γ. It is also possible that being in the neighbourhood of a highly developed district can suffer from negative externality due to moving away of productive resources to the more developed districts, therefore a negative γ.
To capture the neighbourhood effect we take into account geographical location of each district and its neighbouring districts, and build an adjacency matrix W. We
, if district i is adjacent to district j, and zero otherwise (for districts that are not adjacent). Spatial relations may exist because of the geographical proximity among the districts or because of the proximity evolving through economic/business relations. Geographical proximity is exogenous in nature whereas proximity arising out of economic relation is not. Because of endogenity problem that may arise from business relation, we use geographical proximity and not economic proximity, to construct our adjacency matrix.
Before performing our regression we do some pre-testing using Moran Index (I), to see whether this W matrix captures the spillover effect. We find that Moran I for Kelejian and Prucha (2004) .
In the third section, we do a policy exercise by analyzing the effects on the spatial income distribution because of changes in policy variables such as school enrollment (proxy for human capital); banks, electricity, closed drainage system, and drinking water (proxy for social and physical infrastructure); and factories (proxy for investment in productive capacity and opportunities to earn income).
Data, and the results
The data on district-level per-capita income is taken from Planning Commission, Government of India. We include districts from 29 states and 6 union territories in India. development indicators, and we drop them from the final data set. The results are generated using MATLAB.
Results
We find some interesting results. We do not find evidence in support of twin peaks: clustering of the rich income districts, and clustering of low income districts, across India. There has been uniform increase in income among all the districts.
( We observe through considering districts' income data there is definitely no evidence about emergence of twin peaks in any of these periods. There is a shift in the per-capita income density function during these time periods. This is due to a significant increase in the mean, and the median per-capita income, from 1999/2000 to 2004/05.
(FIGURE 1, here) (Figure 1 ). The data suggests that both the rich and poor districts have equally become well-off. There has been a reduction in absolute levels of income poverty among districts.
Next we examine the common externalities of income processes, if any, across geographical boundaries. Put differently, we want to find out the channel through which growth is translating to development, and vice versa. To select the appropriate variables we take note of various growth models (such as Solow growth model, endogenous 13 An income distribution function stochastically dominates another if the percentage of people below any given income is higher in the first (1999/2000) than in the second (2004/05). The income distribution function that stochastically dominates the other also has higher poverty than the other.
growth models, or models dealing with micro-foundation of macroeconomics like rational expectation type models), and existing literature on India's income and development dynamics.
For instance, we consider gini coefficient on the basis of the study by Tendulkar (2010). He admits that there has been a rise in summary measures of relative inequality (gini coefficients) during the Eleventh Five Year Plan . Similarly, following Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982) , and Rosenzweig (1990) , we choose number of hospitals, water and sanitation infrastructure, and school enrollment, respectively, as these variables have significant effect on growth and development indicators of a region. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982) find child mortality in India falls in the presence of more clinics percapita, and in the presence of a better water and sanitation infrastructure (such as closed drainage system). Rosenzweig (1990) finds that higher male wages have a positive income effect on schooling, and raise school enrollment.
As a proxy for access to finance, we choose bank branch, and as a proxy for governance and institution, we choose numbers of murder. Burgess and Pandey (2004) finds that the rural bank branch expansion program in India has a significant effect in terms of reducing rural poverty and in increasing non-agricultural output. Kochar et al. (2006) , finds that states with weaker institutions and poorer infrastructure have experienced lower GDP, and lower industrial growth. Menon and Sanyal (2007) find that labor unrest, credit constraints, and indicator of state's economic health influence location decision of foreign firms investing in India. We take total murder as a proxy for governance.
Finally, Aiyar (2001) , Ahluwalia (2002) , and Purfield (2006) find, investment in productive capacity (especially, private sector investment) is an important factor explaining the variation in state-level income. We include the number of factories per one lakh population as an explanatory variable as a proxy for productive capacity.
Therefore, the independent variables 17 that we consider for our study are gini coefficient (proxy for income inequality); school enrollment (proxy for human capital);
17 One limitation of the data is failure to capture the quality issue for the services that are provided. For example, there are issues relating to teacher absenteeism, quality of drinking water, healthcare services, etc.
Modeling this quality aspect requires experiment such as randomized controlled trial -something outside the scope of this paper.
banks, electricity, closed drainage system, drinking water, and hospitals (proxy for social and physical infrastructure); factories (proxy for investment in productive capacity and opportunities to earn income), and murder (proxy for governance). Our dependent variable is log of per-capita income for 2001/02, and 2004/05. All these data are at a district level. (TABLE 3) Our findings suggest that with the exception of total murder (proxy governance); direct effects of the development variables are statistically significant and are of expected signs. The significant gini coefficient indicates that for any district income inequality is good for income generation. The ongoing reform process cannot be blamed entirely for this occurrence. Reforms encourage more active market participation and hence will not guarantee equal returns to all. While returns to skilled labour are going to increase (due to scarcity in number), unskilled labour will be left out unless necessary skills are developed by that group. However, as the KS test in the earlier section indicates, income inequality within any given district is not contributing to divergence in median income across districts, or regional income inequality. Both the coefficients on factories and school enrollment are positive, and statistically significant, indicating that these factors positively affect income. Similarly, better physical and social infrastructure such as electricity, hospitals, closed drainage system, drinking water, and banks, help business to grow in any particular region. This in turn creates opportunities to earn more income. The coefficient on murder rate is statistically not significant. This may be because of poor conviction rate in India. 18 Infrastructure, physical or social, is a key component that affects income, positively.
While analyzing the direct neighbourhood effect we find the coefficients on factories and electricity are significantly positive, whereas, the coefficient on bank is significantly negative. There is a positive influence on income in district i (captured as W × Number of factories total) if there are more factories in the neighbouring districts.
Similarly, better electricity, by facilitating growth of factories in the neighbouring correlation also implies that the districts with higher per-capita income will continue to perform better. However, as is evident from the KS test results in the earlier section, a higher cross-equation income correlation does not automatically imply an increase in income disparity between the richer and poorer districts, something suggested by Bhattacharya and Sakthivel (2004) in their state-level analysis. Although it might sounds slightly presumptuous, we believe that the private sector (without depending too much on the government) is taking lead in moving capital and labour to areas with lesser input costs (that is, investing more in backward districts), thus contributing to uniform growth process in India.
Policy analysis
We do a policy exercise to quantify percentage change in income variable resulting from one percentage change in policy covariates. This policy exercise is done Consequently income generation and infrastructure development in one district aids in income generation in others in the neighbourhood. This leads to a reduction in income disparity among districts.
Finally, a comparative static policy analysis shows that public expenditure in development in closed drainage systems has the most impact on income generation, possibly though greater public health outcomes. 
